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RECONSIDERING THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:




In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed poised to
offer its definitive position on political gerrymandering
questions. Yet the Court splintered along familiar lines and
failed to offer an unequivocal answer. This Article focuses on the
Court's plurality opinion, and particularly on its conclusion
that judicially manageable standards are wanting in this area.
This conclusion is implausible and masks the real question at
the heart of the case. The Vieth plurality is best understood by
examining the Court's political and prudential concerns as
cabined by the political question doctrine. One understanding
is simply that the plurality is making a call on the merits. A
more intriguing explanation is that the plurality is signaling a
retreat from its aggressive posture of years past: uncomfortable
with the Court's general role in political affairs, the plurality is
finally willing to call it a day. This is a worthy inquiry; in the
wake of Bush v. Gore, we must revisit the Court's entry into the
political arena. Rather than sending us in a futile quest for
standards, Vieth is best understood as inviting such an inquiry.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. B.A., 1990,
J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001, University of Michigan; LL.M., 2002, Georgetown
University Law Center. I am terribly grateful to the many colleagues and friends who read
earlier versions of this Article and offered helpful comments. In particular, many thanks to
Richard Briffault, Guy Charles, Ken Dau-Schmidt, Heather Gerken, Bill Henderson, Michael
Kang, Dan Lowenstein, Tim Lynch, Ajay Mehrotra, Trevor Morrison, Christy Ochoa, David
Williams, and Susan Williams. I am also grateful for the opportunity to present earlier
versions of this Article during a works-in-progress colloquium at the Indiana University-
Bloomington School of Law and a conference on electoral redistricting and the Supreme
Court held at Cornell Law School. All errors remain my own.
1899
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1901
I. EXAMINING THE GERRYMANDERING THICKET: OF
POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL WILL ............. 1908
A. The Two Faces of the Political Question Doctrine ..... 1908
1. The Classical Theory .......................... 1909
2. The Prudential Strain ......................... 1913
B. Political Questions as Questions of Politics:
Luther's Guarantee Clause ....................... 1915
C. Out of Guarantees, for Equality's Sake: Baker v. Carr . 1921
II. RECONSIDERING THE COURT'S OFFICIAL POINT OF ENTRY:
BANDEMER'S PLURALITY OPINION ..................... 1927
III. WHERE ART THou, STANDARDS .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1932
A. Standards, Standards, and More Standards ......... 1933
1. Totality of Circumstances ....................... 1933
2. Vietli" The Plaintiff's Standard .................. 1935
3. Viet." Looking to Established Law-
Stevens and Souter ............................ 1937
B. Vieth's Holy Grail: A Discernible,
Manageable Standard ........................... 1939
IV. EXPLAINING VIETH'S PASSITY: LOOKING FOR VIRTUES? . 1943
A. Taking a Peek .................................. 1943
B. Structure v. Rights .............................. 1945
C. Sending Signals and Keeping Secrets ............... 1947
CONCLUSION ......................................... 1951
[Vol. 47:18991900
RECONSIDERING THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
INTRODUCTION
From the time the Supreme Court officially extended the judicial
power to encompass political gerrymandering questions in Davis v.
Bandemer,' the doctrine has been subject to withering criticism.
While gerrymanders as such were no longer shielded from judicial
review under the guise of "political questions," the legal standard
established in Bandemer was deemed both confusing and confused,
a bar too high for litigants to meet in any useful and practical way.
In the words of a leading commentator, writing more than a decade
ago, "[niot only has the new partisan gerrymandering standard yet
to be used by any court to invalidate any legislative action, but the
Supreme Court also threw its hands in the air when confronted with
the most wanton political gerrymander of the 1980s: the infamous
Burton gerrymander of California."2
In the 2003 Term, the Court set to remedy this condition; the case
was Vieth v. Jubelirer.3 In Vieth, the Court examined Pennsylvania
General Assembly's redistricting handiwork after the 2000 census,
which was a pastiche of facts and conditions that raised many
eyebrows, particularly of those in the Democratic Party.4 This plan
had it all: one-party control of all relevant political posts, a neces-
sary precondition for a partisan gerrymander; pressure from
national party leaders on state actors to craft a partisan plan; a
process where members of the minority party had very little if any
input; and a resulting map that split counties, cities, boroughs and
townships in suspicious ways, including one county, Montgomery
County, divided up among six different congressional districts. The
egregious nature of these facts led one Justice who seemed other-
wise unsympathetic to the plaintiffs to confess nevertheless during
1. 478 U.S. 109, 119-25 (1986) (holding that a political gerrymandering issue was
justiciable after applying the political question analysis originally set out in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
2. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1671 & n.142 (1993) (referring to U.S. Repsentative
Philip Burton's dramatic redistricting plan that increased the Democrats' majority edge in the
California congressional delegation from 22-to-21 in 1980 to 28-to-17 in 1982 despite an
almost evenly divided electorate).
3. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
4. Id. at 272-73.
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the oral argument: "I would concede that what happens here is
unfair in some common-common parlance. It - it - it looks pretty
raw."5 Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
maintained that, "[wihether spoken with concern or pride, it is
unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of declaring
that, when it comes to apportionment, wle are in the business of
rigging elections."6
The story behind Vieth is not about judicial power. In the wake
of Bush v. Gore7 and Shaw v. Reno,8 the question of the availability
vel non of judicial power to address the supposed infirmities of
the political process is no longer considered a serious limitation:
Baker v. Carr9 settled that question long ago and it has not been
questioned seriously since. Rather, Vieth raises squarely and
forcefully the question ofjudicial will:' ° should the courts stay in the
domain of politics in order to rein in such blatant political acts? In
response to this question, the Court in Vieth had two leading
choices. The Court could either strengthen its political gerrymander-
ing doctrine or it could retreat from it, eighteen years after the
doctrine's inauspicious beginning. But the Court did neither.
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, noted that
Bandemer "held that the Equal Protection Clause grants judges
the power-and duty-to control political gerrymandering."" Yet
after eighteen years, Justice Scalia remarked, no standards "have
emerged," not from the lower courts, commentators, or anywhere
else.' 2 For this reason, the plurality concluded that these claims
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (No. 02-1580).
6. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Joseph Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-
SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at Bi).
7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court's order to recount ballots in
the 2000 presidential election).
8. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that racial gerrymandering to create a majority-minority
congressional district was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
9. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
10. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("What is clear is that it is not the
unavailability of judicially manageable standards that drives today's decision. It is, instead,
a failure of judicial will to condemn even the most blatant violations of a state legislature's
fundamental duty to govern impartially.").
11. Id. at 277 (plurality opinion) (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
12. Id. at 281.
1902 [Vol. 47:1899
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must be "nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided." 3
In response, the dissenting Justices argued that such standards
do in fact exist, and they offered three different examples.'4 In the
middle was Justice Kennedy, who was not quite ready to bar all
political gerrymandering questions, but who had yet to find a
standard that met with his approval.'5 To the plurality, this meant
that its opinion controlled for the foreseeable future and that these
claims were off-limits from review." Dissenting Justices argued
otherwise.'"
Vieth is a curious case on many fronts. It is amply clear that
the Supreme Court stands at the epicenter of the electoral world,
firmly in control of all questions political." Support for this
proposition is plentiful, of which Bush v. Gore is only the latest
example. Whether redistricting, racial gerrymandering, or ballot
access, the Court is generally ready and willing to strike a blow in
the name of democracy. In this vein, the mere mention of a lack of
"judicially manageable standards" should strike us as odd and
misplaced; if the Court ever felt shackled by an alleged lack of such
judicially manageable standards, Baker v. Carr and its progeny
13. See id. Fritz Scharpf labels a similar argument "a surprising statement." Fritz W.
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517,
555 (1966) (criticizing an American scholar's attempt to describe political question cases as
lacking "legal principles to apply to the questionf0 presented'" (quoting Oliver P. Field, The
Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485, 512 (1924))).
14. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346-51 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 355-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 309-10, 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. See id. at 305 (plurality opinion).
What are the lower courts to make of [Justice Kennedy's] pronouncement? We
suggest that they must treat it as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability at
district and statewide levels-a vote that may change in some future case but
that holds, for the time being, that this matter is nonjusticiable.
Id.
17. See id. at 368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that Justice Kennedy disagrees with
the plurality on the justiciability issue and "remains in search of appropriate standards").
18. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
155, 156, 185-86 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) (describing the role of constitutional law in
contemporary politics). Some argue that this position is true across doctrines and contexts.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("This Court seems incapable of admitting that some
matters-any matters-are none of its business."); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court,
2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 5, 13-15 (2001).
2006] 1903
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
should have put those concerns to rest. Questions of standards,
process, or doctrinal consistency seldom offer any practical resis-
tance.
And yet, somehow, they offered all the resistance needed in Vieth.
Such resistance must reflect the plurality's implicit assumption
that political gerrymandering questions are different from redis-
tricting questions. This is, however, a questionable assumption
that the plurality never really justified. While there may be a
constitutionally significant distinction between gerrymandering
and redistricting, the distinction is not facially apparent. As the
late Robert Dixon argued, "districting is gerrymandering."9 It is
inherent in the redistricting process that lines on a map, even if
drawn by an impartial and objective independent commission,
will ultimately harm one party and benefit the other.2" Thus, to
adjudicate districting questions is essentially to adjudicate gerry-
mandering questions writ large. This point is directly linked to
both Baker and its immediate progeny. By refusing to act, state
legislatures at the time were in fact gerrymandering their states, in
the sense that their districts were not reflective of the voting
population, and the voting public did not have any way to influence
the outcome of elections.
The Vieth plurality's retreat on the grounds that standards for
adjudication are lacking is suspect for a second reason. We live in
a constitutional world where courts comfortably balance state
interests and apply strict scrutiny or rational basis tests. Such
standards did not descend from the heavens on marble tablets; they
were developed by prior courts, for reasons that might or might not
make any sense at the present time. This is true about judicially
developed standards in general.2' An apt example is the Court's
19. See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW
AND POLITICS 462 (1968); see also Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POLy
REV. 301, 310 (1991) ("Every districting method helps someone at least to the extent of
hurting someone else.").
20. Robert Bork's contribution as a special master to the Connecticut districting process
in the 1970s offers a poignant example of this position. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 88-89 (1990); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair
Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND
REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7, 18-19 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).
21. Martin Redish made this point succinctly some years ago:
1904 [Vol. 47:1899
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early reapportionment jurisprudence. The lessons of these early
cases are clear, as the Court in Reynolds v. Sims22 and subsequent
cases created and enforced standards where none previously existed.
In so doing, these cases offer a working model for the gerrymander-
ing cases. After all, if the Court could implement and enforce the
equipopulation standard in reaction to grossly malapportioned
districts, it should not be terribly challenging for the Court to
implement and enforce an analogous standard, similarly created out
of thin air, in the political gerrymandering cases. Hence, can we
accept the plurality's reasoning at face value?2" Is it true that no
manageable standards avail in this area? And, if manageable
standards in fact exist, what explains the Court's stubborn refusal
to constitutionalize the hated gerrymander?
This Article examines these questions and concludes that Vieth
is a subversive opinion, best understood as signaling a retreat from
the Court's aggressive posture of years past. This argument is
anchored by the Court's historical treatment of the political question
doctrine. From Luther v. Borden24 to Colegrove v. Green25 to Bush v.
Gore, the prudential strand of the doctrine has played a central role
Ultimately, any constitutional provision can be supplied with working standards
of interpretation. To be sure, those standards often will not clearly flow from
either the language or history of the provision, but that fact does not distinguish
them from many judicial standards invoked every day. If we were really to take
seriously the "absence-of-standards" rationale, then we would once again be
proving considerably more than most of us had intended, for a substantial
portion of all constitutional review is susceptible to the same critique.
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1047
(1985); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 870 (1994) (contending that "many important constitutional
provisions are written in broad, open-textured language and certainly do not contain
judicially discoverable and manageable standards'); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law,
Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643,
647 (1989) ("[Why assume ... judicially manageable standards' exist in any of the significant
areas controlled by constitutional doctrine?"); Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94
HARV. L. REV. 681, 687 (1981) ("If standards are lacking under the guarantee clause, it is less
because of any special vacuity of the language than because courts have been unwilling to
develop standards as they have under the equal protection clause.").
22. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. Rick Hasen similarly calls the plurality's argument about standards 'ajudicial sleight
of hand." Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 637 (2004).
24. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
25. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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in shaping the law of democracy. In other words, the Court has
acted or chosen not to act for extralegal reasons. This is not
intended as a criticism of the Court's political question jurispru-
dence; in matters of law and politics, public opinion must play an
important role. Vieth sits comfortably within this political question
tradition. But to hear the plurality tell this particular story, the
doctrine is doing all the work here, not practical or political
considerations. This posture is misleading at best, but not surpris-
ing, for it is part and parcel of the prudential political question
doctrine.26 Thus, Vieth is far more subversive than we have been
led to believe; at the very least, it takes us back to the Court's
point-of-entry into the realm of politics in Baker v. Carr. In so doing,
it demands a reconsideration of the Court's ever-present role in the
law of democracy.
Part I analyzes the political question doctrine, the bedrock
principle at the heart of the gerrymandering question. This analysis
separates the doctrine into two discrete components, the classical
political question doctrine and its "prudential" strand. In light of the
doctrine as understood and developed by the Court itself-and
particularly the fact that "political questions" commonly understood
are now a shell of their former selves-political gerrymandering
questions need not be immune from judicial examination. In
particular, the classical strand of the doctrine is not what it
pretends to be, for its invocation offers very little practical resis-
tance and is ultimately a decision on the merits. As for the
prudential strand, it offers moments when the Court acts in a most
political way, by refusing to act not for legal or doctrinal reasons,
but for political reasons. Thus, on either account, when the Vieth
plurality invoked some of the tenets of the doctrine, we had reason
to wonder about its true motives, especially from the same institu-
tion that gave us Reynolds v. Sims and Shaw v. Reno.27
26. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 462-63 (2004).
27. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 324 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Especially
perplexing is the plurality's ipse dixit distinction of our racial gerrymandering cases.");
Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 680 (2002) (complaining
that the Shaw cases "set the Court off on an essentially standardless journey") [hereinafter
Karlan, Exit Strategies]; Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in
1906 [Vol. 47:1899
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Parts II and III examine the plurality's demands in Vieth for a
"judicially manageable standard." Part II offers a reading of the
plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, the focal point in the Court's
modem quest to develop standards to regulate the hated gerryman-
der. This Part situates Bandemer within the voting rights tradition
of Baker v. Carr and its progeny and thus immediately questions the
assertion that standards do not exist in this area. Part III parses
through many proposed standards, none of which met with the
plurality's approval. In so doing, it makes clear that many such
standards exist. This Part concludes that we cannot accept the
plurality's argument on its face. Something else must be at work
here.
Finally, Part IV offers some explanations for the Court's
uncustomary passivity. One explanation is that the plurality
misunderstands the intrinsic nature of the harms at issue. While
the Court as a whole approaches claims about the law of democracy
as individual rights claims, it should understand them instead as
structural claims. Although I largely agree with this argument in
the abstract,28 it is questionable whether it explains the dynamics
of the Vieth case and its many opinions. A more obvious conclusion
is that the plurality is clearly taking a look at the merits of the
controversy. This conclusion places the plurality in good historical
company, for the Court has often invoked a lack-of-standards
rationale in cases where it is making a call on the merits.29 If this
were the extent of Vieth, the case would hardly be worth our close
attention. But there is more. This Part ultimately concludes that the
Court is after much bigger game. If we take the Vieth plurality at its
word, we must take a closer look at the Court's role in crafting the
law of democracy.
the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 299 (1996) (explaining that the Shaw cases "raise
many of the problems Baker identified as characteristic of nonjusticiable political questions:
[e.g.,] 'a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards').
28. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Trusting Democracy (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author).
29. See Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of
the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HoFsTRA L. REv. 215,219-20 (1985) ("Correctly understood, the
'lack of standards' cases are simply merit determinations of constitutionality."). For further
support, see infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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I. EXAMINING THE GERRYMANDERING THICKET: OF POLITICAL
QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL WILL
The Vieth plurality displayed a passivity the likes of which we
seldom see. At the heart of this posture lies the political question
doctrine, in the form of a professed lack of judicially manageable
standards.3 0 When the plurality invoked the mantra of judicially
manageable standards, it implicitly situated its opinion within the
larger world of political questions. This is a world where the Court
has traditionally behaved in a prudential fashion and standards
have played a minimal role. This observation applies with particular
force to those moments when the Court has sought to regulate the
law of democracy, as discussed below. The discussion develops over
the course of three sections.
Subpart A takes a broad view of the problem and analyzes the
political question doctrine in both its classical and prudential
forms. Subpart B narrows the discussion by bringing the larger
debate to bear on the gerrymandering issue. In particular, this
subpart examines the one case deemed to have foreclosed any and
all judicial inquiries of redistricting questions: Luther v. Borden.
Finally, Subpart C connects the previous sections to the question of
standards as understood and debated within the gerrymandering
field. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green plays a
leading role in this particular story,3 ' as does the Court's opinion in
Baker v. Carr.
A. The Two Faces of the Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine seems out of place in our modem
constitutional landscape. In an era of strong judicial supremacy, it
points to those times when the Court appeared willing to step aside
and leave decisions by the political branches undisturbed, perhaps
even unreviewed. To be sure, there is no universal agreement with
respect to the nature and scope of the doctrine; some commentators
dispute whether any such doctrine exists at all,32 while others
30. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
31. 328 U.S. 549, 550-56 (1946).
32. See Louis Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 passim
1908 [Vol. 47:1899
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debate and defend different understandings of it.3 3 This first subpart
analyzes the doctrine and its many criticisms.
1. The Classical Theory
'Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."34
Fittingly, the political question doctrine dates back to the
Supreme Court's handling of William Marbury's lawsuit, its seed
sown in Alexander Hamilton's oft-cited Federalist No. 78." It is thus
safe to say that it all started with a commission-William Marbury's
commission, to be exact, which he received from President Adams
to serve as a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia.36
Thomas Jefferson assumed office a few days later and instructed his
Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the commission.3 7
Marbury subsequently asked the Court for a writ of mandamus to
force the President to give him what was due to him.3" Of note, he
filed this suit as a matter of first instance with the Supreme Court.
This lawsuit put the Court in a bind. The new administration had
made its position on this issue amply clear; Madison himself did not
appear during a preliminary hearing and Levi Lincoln, the Attorney
General, suggested that he lacked instructions about how the
(1976); Redish, supra note 21, at 1032-33; Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1970).
33. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF PoLrIcs 70, 183-98 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (developing the
prudential version of the doctrine); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1959) (defending the classical version of the
doctrine). For a defense of the doctrine grounded on a model of the political system as one of
"shared responsibilit[ies]," see J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 100-01 (1988).
34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393,
424 (1996) (describing how Hamilton "foreshadowed the political question" debate).
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government should proceed.3" Yet the Court could not be seen as a
weak institution, afraid of the executive and its powers. It was in
response to Chief Justice Marshall's resolution of this quandary
that Robert McCloskey would write that the Court's opinion was "a
masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity
to sidestep danger while seeming to court it, to advance in one
direction while his opponents [were] looking in another."4 ° In short,
Marshall had to pay close attention to contemporary public opinion
as represented through the office of the executive. Marshall knew
as much, of course; prudence must carry the day.
While in the midst of this conundrum, Marshall asked the
following question:
Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be
considered as a mere political act, belonging to the executive
department alone, for the performance of which, entire confi-
dence is placed by our constitution in the supreme executive;
and for any misconduct respecting which, the injured individual
has no remedy[?]"
This was a matter of first principles. As Marshall noted, some issues
are reserved for the executive alone, as a matter of constitutional
design, "in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion."42
This was a sphere of boundless authority, and as such, "whatever
opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive
discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion."43 This must mean, as Marshall made clear,
that within this sphere, executive decisions are "conclusive,"' and
the President is accountable "in his political character, and to his
own conscience. "
Marshall's position is known as the classical theory." Its
crucial insight is its insistence that political question inquiries
39. See id. at 143.
40. ROBERT G. McCLosKEY, THE AMERIcAN SUPREME COURT 25 (3d ed. 2000).
41. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
42. Id. at 165-66.
43. Id. at 166.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Scharpf, supra note 13, at 518.
1910 [Vol. 47:1899
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must be understood as constitutional commands, grounded in the
constitutional text. On Marshall's own account, it is a question of
constitutional interpretation, of whether the Constitution places
"entire confidence" in the political branches for performance of the
act in question.47 As recently developed by Herbert Wechsler, the
inquiry is "whether the Constitution has committed to another
agency of government [other than the courts] the ... determination
of the issue."' s This understanding of the political question doctrine
thus looks to the constitutional text and proscriptions not of its own
making. This is an exercise in constitutional interpretation as
traditionally undertaken by the courts.
And yet, what are we to make of the fact that the modern
Supreme Court finds very few instances of abstention under the
classical theory? This observation is particularly true in the wake
of Powell v. McCormack,49 where the Court held, in the face of
seemingly controlling language of Article I, Section 5,50 that the
House of Representatives did not have the power to "exclude"5 an
elected member of the body who met the explicit requirements set
down under this section.52 In the Court's words, "[pletitioners
[sought] a determination that the House was without power to
exclude Powell from the 90th Congress, which, we have seen,
requires an interpretation of the Constitution-a determination for
which clearly there are 'judicially ... manageable standards.' 53 On
this reading, an inquiry that involves a question of constitutional
interpretation is ipso facto not committed to other branches of
47. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164; see also Melville Fuller Weston, Political Questions,
38 HARV. L. REV. 296,301 (1925) ("Judicial questions ... are those which the sovereign has set
to be decided in the courts."). Weston states that "[tlhe problem is one of interpretation in a
very well understood sense." Id.
48. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 7-8.
49. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1 (stating that legislative officials have the exclusive power
"to Judge ... the ... Qualifications of its own Members").
51. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.
52. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.").
53. Powell, 395 U.S. at 549. But see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For a
criticism of this aspect of Nixon, see Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee
Clause, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 887, 915 (1994) ("The Chief Justice cannot have been wearing a
very straight face when in Nixon he insisted, citing Baker, that there were no 'judicially
manageable standards' by which courts could say whether a case had been 'tried.').
20061 1911
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
government. This is a broad and forgiving reading of the "committed
to another branch" factor of the political question doctrine, a reading
that prompted a leading commentator to suggest that "the Court's
failure to require judicial abstention in those instances where
scripture can most plausibly be read to require it leaves a strong
sense that the present Justices are not disposed to find many-or
any-issues in fact so textually committed."54 Others have similarly
questioned whether, under its "classic" rubric, the political question
is, "for all intents and purposes[,] ... dead."55
The classical theory has also been subject to internal criticism.
For instance, some critics point to the obvious difficulties-the
"considerable obscurity about the nature of the constitutional
analysis 56-that lead the Court to conclude that some powers are
committed to the executive and the legislature, yet not others. Some
also question Chief Justice Marshall's posture because it "does no
work not already done by substantive provisions of constitutional
law."57
These arguments, taken together, offer a view of the classical
theory as obsolete, no longer useful in a doctrinal sense. Such is the
force of judicial supremacy in general and the Court's fondness for
protecting and expanding its own power in particular. In the place
of the classical political question doctrine, the Court has turned to
the prudential strand of the doctrine. In so doing, and as the next
section explains, the constitutional text has decidedly taken a back
seat to prudential considerations and matters of politics.
54. Henkin, supra note 32, at 604-05; see Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions
Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon v United States, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 147 ("If
the plaintiff has a real stake and articulates a real injury, the Court tends to adjudicate the
case, even in the face of arguments that the case should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable
political question. Powell v McCormack is a good example." (footnote omitted)); Mark Tushnet,
Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the
Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1209 (2002) ("Powell and the
reapportionment cases following Baker v. Carr show how easy it is to interpret the clauses at
issue in order not to commit the question to the political branches.").
55. R. Brooke Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does It Stand After Powell
v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown, and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 481
(1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mulhern, supra note 33, at 163 ("It is difficult to
formulate an argument that the text mandates a commitment of any issue we would
otherwise consider 'legal' to the political branches of government. Moreover, the Supreme
Court rejected the strongest argument of that sort in Powell v. McCormack.").
56. Scharpf, supra note 13, at 540.
57. Seidman, supra note 26, at 444.
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2. The Prudential Strain
"[The political question doctrine is] something greatly more
flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not
principle. "
"[Wihen a tribunal approaches a question," Maurice Finkelstein
wrote many decades ago, "where on one horn of the dilemma is the
trained moral sentiment of the judge, and on the other the 'hypersen-
sitive nerve of public opinion,' it will 'shy off and throw the burden
of the decision on other shoulders."59 This is a strand of the political
question doctrine that frees itself from constitutional strictures and
precommitments. In so doing, it offers the Court varying ways by
which to protect its own standing and legitimacy. This is known as
the prudential strand of the doctrine,' as championed by Alexander
Bickel.61 To the question of scope, and to what issues the doctrine
applies, Finkelstein responded:
It applies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time,
will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take
jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from
the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on
the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feeling
that the court is incompetent to deal with the particular type of
question involved. Sometimes it will be induced by the feeling
that the matter is "too high" for the courts.2
This is not the language of legal doctrine and constitutional
interpretation but, rather, a view of the Court as politically savvy,
aware of its surroundings and the political terrain on which its
opinions must take root. This is the language of politics, not law.
This is subversive language, to be sure, for it allows-indeed
58. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 125-26.
59. Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 339 (1924).
60. Or perhaps the functional one. See Scharpf, supra note 13, at 534 ("Professor Bickel's
justification of the passive virtues is, at bottom, a functional one.').
61. BICKEL, supra note 33, passim (arguing that the Court should be comprised of
practical lawyer-scholars who understand the limits of decisional law); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,
passim (1961) (discussing the 1960 Supreme Court Term's use of adjudicated restraint).
62. Finkelstein, supra note 59, at 344-45 (citations omitted).
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requires-that the Court set aside its constitutional judgment even
when such a judgment is demanded by existing constitutional
doctrine. 3
Alexander Bickel revitalized this strain of the doctrine decades
later, at a time when the Court was under direct attack from
various quarters. His project was to justify the exercise of judicial
review-a practice that, to Bickel, was "at least potentially a
deviant institution in a democratic society,"--while at the same
time defending the Court's intervention in Brown v. Board of
Education.6' His answer embraced a realpolitik view of the Court
and its awareness of social and political realities. In specific
reference to the political question doctrine, Bickel's stated
foundations for the doctrine make this point particularly well. They
include
the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal
parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to
principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which
tends to unbalance judicial judgement; (c) the anxiety, not so
much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps
it should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"),
the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is
electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength
from."
Notably, these are not factors that a supreme and confident court
must consider, a court neither troubled nor concerned whether the
public will comply with its rulings. Rather, these are prudential
factors, considered by a court in order to facilitate those moments
when the court must "avoid harm to itself or to the nation." 7
Principled decision making must sometimes mean acting pruden-
tially. For Bickel, this axiom stood at the core of his view of the
political question doctrine.
63. Seegenerally Seidman, supra note 26 (discussing the prudential strand of the doctrine,
the Court's use of it, and the resulting implications).
64. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 128.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. Id. at 184.
67. Tushnet, supra note 54, at 1232.
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As might be expected, this model of judicial review in general,
and the political question doctrine in particular, has ruffled many
contemporary feathers. The disagreement boils down to one central
question: where should courts draw the proper boundary between
political and judicial questions?68 The prudential strand offers a
flexible and shifting boundary, to be drawn by the courts in
accordance to prevailing trends in public opinion. To its critics, this
point was wrong, and "obviously" so.69 To them, this must be a line
grounded in principle and law, not public opinion,70 which ipso facto
undermines the valence of the prudential account. To Bickel, of
course, the doctrine "resists being domesticated."v' Scholars disagree
about the accuracy of this assertion.72
B. Political Questions as Questions of Politics: Luther's Guarantee
Clause
The political question doctrine, in both its classical and pruden-
tial forms, has played a central role in developing the rich traditions
of the law of democracy. At the heart of these traditions stands the
Guarantee Clause--"the constitutional boogeyman" 73-and the
understanding that the federal courts must not intervene in
questions of politics. The arguments thus began and ended with the
Court's refusal to intervene in Rhode Island's troubled affairs of
state. The case was Luther v. Borden.74
68. See Weston, supra note 47, at 299 ("The line which needs to be sought is one which
may conceivably divide matters equally turbulent, requiring the courts to disclaim power over
the cause in one instance, and requiring them to assert jurisdiction in another.").
69. Id.
70. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1964) (criticizing Bickel
for demanding use of principle only part of the time). But cf Herbert Wechsler, Book Review,
75 YALE L.J. 672, 674 (1966) (reviewing BICKEL, supra note 33 (criticizing Bickel's argument
for overreliance on principle)).
71. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 125.
72. Compare Seidman, supra note 26, at 442 ('My argument, then, is that the Court has
never-and never can-develop constitutional rules that control the political judgments, as
so understood, that it regularly makes."), with Tushnet, supra note 54, at 1204 (contending
that, in making this assertion, Bickel "was wrong").
73. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections
on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1113 (2002).
74. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see also 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 459-69 (1923) (explaining the Luther decision); WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
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The facts in Luther stemmed from those "unfortunate political
differences which agitated the people of Rhode Island in 1841 and
1842,"75 and which led to the so-called Dorr's Rebellion. 6 On one
side of the dispute was the charter government, which dated back
to the Crown's grant of the charter in 1663.77 Under the charter, the
right to vote was restricted to "freemen," defined by statute as those
who owned $134 worth of real property, and their eldest sons. 78 The
charter also apportioned the lower house of the General Assembly;
it granted two representatives to each town, yet four each to
Providence, Portsmouth, and Warwick and six to Newport.79 This
provision eventually led to a severely malapportioned legislature.
For example, in 1840, Smithfield, a town of 9534 inhabitants, was
represented by two representatives. Yet, Portsmouth, with 1706
inhabitants, had four representatives.
On the other side of the dispute stood the reformers, and in light
of these disparities their demands were initially quite modest. They
wished to see the right to vote extended to all taxpayers or militia-
men,80 or else they wanted a convention that would consider this
issue. For quite some time, the General Assembly would grant them
neither. This initial group ultimately disbanded, to be replaced by
a more radical group, the Rhode Island Suffrage Association. The
strength of this new group led the General Assembly to call a
convention in 1841 (the "Freeholder's Convention") and to submit a
new constitution for a vote.8 ' The Suffragists also submitted their
own constitution. The Suffragists' constitution was allegedly ratified
by a majority of eligible voters (all white male residents of the
state); 2 the Freeholder's was not. At this point, and as a political
crisis loomed, the charter government established martial law. The
THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTnmION 111-29 (1972) (same).
75. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34.
76. See id. at 37.
77. ARTHUR MAY MowRy, THE DORR WAR, OR THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE IN RHODE
ISLAND 8 (1901).
78. Id. at 19-20, 74.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 57.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Scholars disagree as to whether a majority in fact supported the constitution. See
GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861, at 76 (1976);
MOWRY, supra note 77, at 112-17.
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Suffragists held their elections in 1842 under the new constitution
and elected Thomas Dorr the new governor of the state.
By the end of the year, the rebellion ultimately subsided and the
charter government prevailed, but under an amended constitution
that conceded some ground to the suffragist cause. But the
dispute was hardly over. Soon after the charter government had
declared martial law, Martin Luther violated the law by acting as
a moderator at the election under the Suffragist constitution.
Luther fled to Massachusetts, where Luther Borden, head of a
Freeholder's posse, found him. Borden broke into Luther's house,
"searched for incriminating evidence [of the rebellion], and terror-
ized Luther's female relatives.""3
Luther brought a trespass claim in U.S. Circuit Court in Rhode
Island the following year, which Borden defended as authorized
by the charter government.' Luther further asserted that the
Suffragist government led by Dorr was the only legitimate govern-
ment of the state, and as such, acts by the charter government were
void.85 The jury sided with Borden,86 and Luther sought a writ of
error from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The case reached the Supreme Court in 1845, but delays and
contingencies set the case back a number of years.87 The Court
finally heard arguments in 1848.' In an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Taney and announced the following year, the Court upheld
the lower court's ruling.89 Notably, the Court also concluded that it
lacked power to hear the claim.9 °
83. WIECEK, supra note 73, at 114.
84. Id. at 114-15.
85. Id. at 115.
86. In fairness to Luther's case, Justice Story, then riding circuit, did not allow him to
present evidence of his claim that the Suffragist government under Dorr was the only
legitimate government in the state, and also gave instructions to the jury that the order to
impose martial law was justified. See id. at 115. For claims and evidence of Justice Story's
bias, see id. at 114 n.6, and John S. Schuchman, The Political Background of the Political-
Question Doctrine: The Judges and the Dorr War, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 111, 117 passim
(1972) (discussing the participation and views of judges involved in resolving the conflict
described as the Dorr War, including Justice Story).
87. WIECEK, supra note 73, at 115.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 118-19.
90. Id. at 120.
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The Court began its analysis by offering its fatalistic vision of
what judicial intervention in the case would ultimately wreak: "For,
if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as proposed
by the plaintiff,"9 and if the Court were to side with Dorr and his
supporters, it would invalidate all actions by the charter govern-
ment, from enacted laws to collected taxes and paid salaries, and it
would subject the state actors who carried out these decisions to
trespass actions.92 The Court thus explained, and in so doing showed
its prudential stripes: "When the decision of this court might lead to
such results, it becomes its duty to examine very carefully its own
powers before it undertakes to exercise jurisdiction."93
Careful examination led to inaction. The Court's reasons were
simple:
[The U.S. Constitution,] as far as it has provided for an emer-
gency of this kind, and authorized the general government to
interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the
subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the
hands of that department [under the Guarantee Clause]."
It was ultimately up to Congress-not the courts-to decide which
one of the two governments was the legitimate government of Rhode
Island.9" Questions of a judicial nature, "confided to [the Court] by
the Constitution," properly belonged to the Court; yet it was
"equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of action,
and to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly
belong to other forums."96
Luther is commonly understood as a political question case, a case
in which the Court must not interfere with political controversies
not of its own making. This is the "nonjusticiability thesis."97 This
91. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38 (1849).
92. See id. at 38-39.
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 47.
97. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 749, 753
(1994). But cf. Henkin, supra note 32, at 608 (contending that the Court simply concluded that
Congress and the President "were within their constitutional authority and did not violate
any prescribed limits or prohibitions"). To Martin Redish, however, "Henkin's analysis
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reading of Luther is curious in three ways. First, the constitutional
analysis by the majority is scant at best, leading some scholars to
view the case as a classical political question case, yet tinged with
clear prudential overtones.9" Second, the opinion is on its face a very
narrow one, holding only that it is up to Congress or the President
to decide which of two competing state governments is the legiti-
mate one.99 Only later did dictum from the case become the leading
understanding of the opinion. This point is buttressed by a third:
that various cases in the aftermath of Luther v. Borden continued
to interpret the Guarantee Clause on the merits." ° Only over time
did the Court begin to interpret the case exclusively as a classical
case, and the text of the clause-"The United States shall ... -- as
amounts to little more than a play on words." Redish, supra note 21, at 1036.
98. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 257 (2002);
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 639 (2001); see also
Finkelstein, supra note 59, at 343-44 ("A careful reading of this opinion can leave very little
doubt that the crux of the decision is the unwillingness of the court to enter into the fray.").
Compare in this vein Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Court reached the
merits in a case that seemed indisputably to fall within the commands of the political question
doctrine. It is crucial that the question for the Court in Powell was whether the 90th Congress
had unconstitutionally deprived Representative Powell of his seat at a time when Powell was
already seated in the 91st Congress. See id. at 494-95. A much tougher question for the Court,
and a more difficult challenge for the political question doctrine, would have arisen had the
Court decided the case during the 90th Congress. One commentator questions whether the
Court would have reached the merits then:
All the [Powell] Court ... ordered the District Court to do ... was declare that the
House had acted unconstitutionally in excluding Powell. It did not involve itself
in the issues of seniority, back pay, and the $25,000 fine [imposed on Powell by
the 90th Congress]. Thus, on the basis of the Court decision alone, there was
nothing to enforce-and hence no enforcement problem.
PILIPPA STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "PoLrITcAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
EVASION 127 (1974). It is quite telling that Powell ultimately sought enforcement, yet the
Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus. See Powell v. Hart, 396 U.S. 1055 (1970) (mem.).
The controversy ended when Powell retired and left the country. See STRUM, supra, at 128.
99. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 534 (1962); see also Note, supra note 21, at
683 ("[Luther] applies only when a state is in armed upheaval, with more than one faction
contending to be the legitimate government.").
100. See, e.g., Att'y Gen. of Mich. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233,238-39 (1905); Taylor
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578-81 (1900); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 515-18 (1897);
In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449,461-62 (1891); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76
(1875).
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referring exclusively to the political branches.'' To be sure, this
reading of the clause is neither inescapable 2 nor universal.103
For my purposes, Luther's value lies in its confession that, were
the Court to try to decide this issue on its own, it would not know
what to do. "Besides," the Court began in a most telling passage, "if
the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could
it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or
rejection of the proposed constitution"?1' This argument is akin to
the now conventional "judicially manageable standards" factor. How
should a court decide, absent preexisting state laws, whether a
government lays legitimate claim to its authority in a given state?
This query is particularly difficult in light of the particular facts
surrounding the Luther litigation.
One problem was simply temporal: Dorr's Rebellion took place
around the year 1843, yet the case arrived at the Court years later,
and the opinion was not issued until 1849. By this time, of course,
the events of 1843 were but a distant memory. Could the Court
possibly side with a nonexistent government? To ask this question
is to answer it. Yet, this obvious answer gave rise to a far more
difficult problem. As Charles Warren explained in his authoritative
history, the Court in Luther faced "dark forebodings and the
mischievously false predictions as to its partisan bias, made by
Clay, Kent, Peters and other Whigs, upon the retirement of Judge
Story. No case had ever come before it in which the possibility of
division on political lines was greater...."' The Dorrite cause was
101. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 137, 151 (1912).
102. See Henkin, supra note 32, at 609 (concluding that this "reading of the guarantee
clause was not inevitable"); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 75 (1988) ("This reference
to the 'United States' plainly encompasses the judicial branch, as well as the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government.").
103. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1992) (reviewing Court history
indicating that some Guarantee Clause issues are justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
582 (1964) (stating that political questions acted on by Congress are reviewable by the courts
for equal protection issues); Jackson, supra note 55, at 502 n.146 ("Even the Guaranty Clause
does not, however, afford Congress the opportunity to engage in unreviewable constitutional
interpretation."); Weinberg, supra note 53, at 941 ("What is notable here is that the New York
Court resolved the Guarantee Clause issue on the merits, not under Luther or Baker.").
104. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849). To the Court, the only available guide
would be found in "some previous law of the State." Id.
105. 2 WARREN, supra note 74, at 460.
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then embodied by the larger question of popular sovereignty and
the power of the people to change their own government. Adding
much fuel-to the fire, the newspapers carried on about the case at
length, their opinions clearly clouded by their political predisposi-
tions."'
The Court was thus clearly at the center of a political firestorm,
sure to find trouble regardless of the step it chose to take. Siding
with Luther would create grave practical difficulties, as the Court
made clear in the body of its opinion. Yet, siding with Borden would
bring problems of its own, not the least of which was the charge of
partisanship and the danger that the relevant publics would refuse
to accept the Court's ruling.
107
Chief Justice Taney could see and appreciate these difficulties.
Thus, in order to minimize the peril facing the Court, he framed the
question in Luther as one of choosing among two seemingly
legitimate governments.0" And to the Court, that question was a
difficult one.'0 9 In light of the political minefield in its path, the
Court took a page out of Chief Justice Marshall's magisterial book.
Prudence carried the day, and the Court did what any self-respect-
ing Court should do: it punted, for the sake of the Court, Rhode
Island, and the Nation.
C. Out of Guarantees, for Equality's Sake: Baker v. Carr
In due time, this view of the Court's power came to dominate
the redistricting field. The first case to declare so was Colegrove
v. Green."' Speaking for three members of the Court, Justice
Frankfurter offered a number of reasons for refusing to intervene
in "the politics of the people.""' One argument was simply
106. See id. at 460-69.
107. For a discussion of this and other difficulties facing the Court, see STRUM, supra note
97, at 22.
108. This is not to say that this was the right question. See Weinberg, supra note 53, at
930-31 ("[T]he question in Luther was not which of two elected governments was the
legitimate one. The question was whether the existing government was constitutionally
elected. Why should that not be an adjudicable question?").
109. To be clear, this might have been a difficult political question, not a legal one. See id.
at 928.
110. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
111. Id. at 554.
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precedential: agreeing with the lower court,'12 Justice Frankfurter
felt bound by the recent Wood v. Broom decision." 3 But he did not
stop there. In true prudential form, he further explained:
We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what is
beyond its competence to grant. This is one of those demands on
judicial power which cannot be met by verbal fencing about
"jurisdiction." It must be resolved by considerations on the basis
of which this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene
in controversies. It has refused to do so because due regard for
the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to
be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for
judicial determination." 4
Tellingly, no preestablished constitutional rule demanded this
argument, and Justice Frankfurter did not pretend to offer any. He
was clearly siding with the prudential strand of the political
question doctrine. This was one of those times when the Court had
to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, as "due regard for the effective
working of our Government""5 demanded no less. This is not the
language of law and constitutional doctrine."'
In closing, and to be fair, Justice Frankfurter did nod toward a
host of constitutional proscriptions to support his argument. Yet his
language is curious at best and his use of the relevant constitutional
clauses is suspect. "The Constitution has many commands that are
112.
Our study of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Wood v. Broom ...
has resulted in our reaching a conclusion contrary to that which we would have
reached but for that decision. We are an inferior court. We are bound by the
decision of the Supreme Court, even though we do not agree with the decision
or the reasons which support it. We have been unable to distinguish this case
and as members of an inferior court, we must follow it. Only the Supreme Court
can overrule that decision.
Colegrove v. Green, 64 F. Supp. 632, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
113. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 551.
114. Id. at 552.
115. Id.
116. This should not be surprising. According to Dan Ortiz, Justice Frankfurter did not
want to enshrine any one theory of politics over others; rather, he wished to leave the matter
open. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 461-65 (2004). This argument
ties Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion to Justice O'Connor's Bandemer concurrence. See id. at
465, 494.
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not enforceable by courts," he began, "because they clearly fall
outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial
action."" 7 His first example was Article IV, Section 2: while it is the
duty of a state to return a fugitive found within its borders, "the
fulfilment of this duty cannot be judicially enforced.""' His second
example was more familiar: "Violation of the great guaranty of a
republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the
courts."" 9 On the strength of this language, if Colegrove rested on
the demands of the Guarantee Clause, Justice Frankfurter had a
very curious way of showing it. 2 ° His Colegrove opinion clearly did
not argue the point but assumed it so, thus leading to the conclusion
that the Court was refusing to act despite its clear power to do so.''
Yet Colegrove took on a life of its own.'22 In subsequent cases, the
Court either dismissed the claims in short per curiam opinions that
cited Colegrove and subsequent cases 2 or else addressed the
question on the merits and ruled against the complainants.' 24
117. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)).
120. Louis Henkin agrees. In his view,
[Frankfurter] was saying that Congress has power under the Constitution to
regulate the manner of electing representatives, and Congress had done so, both
affirmatively as well as by accepting what the state legislatures had done; that
what Congress had done or accepted did not violate any constitutional limitation
or prohibition.
Henkin, supra note 32, at 616.
121. Justice Frankfurter admitted as much in his dissenting opinion in Baker, when he
remarked that "[b]oth opinions joining in the result in Colegrove v. Green agreed that
considerations were controlling which dictated denial of jurisdiction though not in the strict
sense of want of power." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
122. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 191 (1964)
("Frankfurter, having decided that it was unwise for the Court to decide Colegrove, sought to
elevate his decision into a binding principle to prevent all later Courts from deciding whether
or not they wished to decide such cases."); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 201 (2000) ("Subsequent to Colegrove, the Court had disposed of a
number of cases summarily, reinforcing the belief that Frankfurter's position was the Court's
position.").
123. See Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (per curiam) (citing Kidd v. McCanless, 352
U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam); Colegrove, 328 U.S. 659); Kidd, 352 U.S. 920 (citing Anderson
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam); Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549); Anderson, 343 U.S. 912
(citing MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948)).
124. See MacDougall, 335 U.S. at 284 ("The Constitution-a practical instrument of
government-makes no such demands on the states."). In South v. Peters, the Court offered
its traditional nod to MacDougall, Broom, and Colegrove, while explaining that "[flederal
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Taken together, these cases told a clear story: the doors to the
federal courts buildings were closed shut to these types of claims.
Prospective litigants got the message, loud and clear. 2 '
This condition lasted until 1962 and Baker v. Carr, when the
Court ended the era ofnonjusticiability over redistricting questions.
The Court in Baker confronted the same problem it faced in
Colegrove, with a twist: while the political process in Illinois seemed
stagnant and resistant to change, the process in Tennessee did
not afford its citizens any way to effect change, absent the "aroused
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives" of which Justice Frankfurter spoke.'26 But it was
clear to anyone paying attention that this was not going to happen.
Absent judicial intervention, the process was sealed from change.
This political reality gave rise to the need, on prudential and
pragmatic grounds, for judicial action.'27
Once it decided to intervene, the Court did not simply take the
obvious path of overruling prior precedents, such as Colegrove and,
perhaps, Luther.'28 Instead, the Court shifted ground and turned
courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues
arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political
subdivisions." 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950). Yet, as Professor Lucas wrote in a noteworthy article
at the time of Baker, "it is difficult to view South as other than a decision on the merits." Jo
Desha Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
194, 227.
125. See, e.g., GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN
LEVELLERSpassim (1972).
126. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1958) (arguing that judicial inaction is no longer "required legally nor
effective practically").
128. In his dissenting opinion in Baker, Justice Frankfurter did put an interesting gloss
on the Colegrove decision: "The Colegrove doctrine, in the form in which repeated decisions
have settled it, was not an innovation. It represents long judicial thought and experience.
From its earliest opinions this Court has consistently recognized a class of controversies
which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies." Baker, 369 U.S. at
280 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But it is hard to make much of this analysis. As Dean
McKay explained at the time in reference to Colegrove and Justice Frankfurter's opinion:
The Frankfurter opinion was nothing less than a judicial coup de grdce, for it
managed to reverse, or at least cast doubt on, an established line of
[reapportionment] cases, announcing the new rule as a dictum in a minority
opinion... supported only by an earlier concurring opinion [in Wood] which was
itself undocumented. This might appropriately be described as triple bootstrap.
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 67
(1965).
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away from the Guarantee Clause and toward the Equal Protection
Clause. This move was warranted by the Court's view that cases
under the Guarantee Clause foreclose a search for standards
because no such standards exist.'29 This move has been criticized
through the years, 30 most recently by Judge McConnell, who
complained that "it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the fateful
decision to shift ground to equal protection was made for no reason
other than to avoid the appearance of a departure from the
nonjusticiability precedents."' Instead, McConnell argued that the
Court should have rested its holding on the Guarantee Clause. 2
Justice Brennan could see this argument, to be sure, but he knew
full well that Justice Stewart was unwilling to disturb any long-
standing precedents and that turning to the Guarantee Clause
"would have brought a head-on confrontation with Luther v. Borden
129. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 223. This is a curious and oft-criticized reading of the
Guarantee Clause. See Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 871.
Baker speaks of instances where there is a lack of judicially discoverable or
manageable standards. Yet, there is no reason why "republican form of
government" is more lacking in standards than "due process" or "equal
protection." ... Indeed, if the Court decided cases under the Guarantee Clause,
judicial standards would emerge.
Id.; see also Merritt, supra note 101, at 76 ("Enforcing the fundamentals of republican
government provides a judicial standard at least as manageable as the malleable standards
supplied by the equal protection or due process clauses.").
130. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The present case
involves all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases non-justiciable. It is,
in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label."); Bonfield, supra
note 98,passim (arguing that the Guarantee Clause provides the Court with powers not found
in the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on
the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CAL. L. REV. 245, 251 (1962)
[hereinafter Bonfield, New Light] ("Mhe same issue may be justiciable if raised under the
equal protection clause, and nonjusticiable if raised under the guarantee. This seems a rather
peculiar doctrine, since it is difficult to understand how an issue contains any more of the
elements of nonjusticiability when pleaded under the latter provision.").
131. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLi 103, 107 (2000).
132. See id. at 105-07; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political
Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption"Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1165, 1200 (2002) (contending that the Court should have looked to the Guarantee Clause and
approached the issue "with tremendous deference to both the states and the federal political
departments, whose judgments should not be overturned except in the most compelling
circumstances (such as a state's establishment of martial law or a theocracy)"). For earlier
arguments pressing this particular point, see Bonfield, New Light, supra note 129, passim,
in which he argues that the Court should base future decisions on the Guarantee Clause and
its provision of a republican form of government.
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and Pacific States v. Oregon."' Had the Court turned to the
Guarantee Clause, the litigation would likely have been different:
"either no litigation at all, or not until-and unless--Justices came
along willing to overrule what would, by then, have been a potent
precedent 'counter-Baker.'"'34
Another virtue of this turn to equal protection, at least according
to the Brennan majority, lay in its approach to the question of
standards. Following the traditional view that the Guarantee
Clause did not provide the Court with any judicially manageable
standards, Brennan argued that the Equal Protection Clause did.
The passage is now quite familiar to modern ears: "Judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts
they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious action."35 As expected, it is precisely here
where the majority and the dissent found much room for disagree-
ment. To the Court, standards were discernible and familiar; yet to
Justice Frankfurter, no such standards existed, 36 a point that
linked for him this new foray into redistricting issues and cases
under the Guarantee Clause.'37
133. Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being 'Present at the Creation," 80 N.C. L. REV. 1505,
1508-09 (2002) (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 1510.
135. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226; see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection,
and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1358
(2002) (arguing that the lower courts "were given the proper room after Baker to decide
redistricting questions in accordance with their particular views about rationality and
arbitrariness"); see also Scharpf, supra note 13, at 556-57 ("There was surely no dearth of
possible standards for reapportionment. The Court could have chosen a 'minimum rationality
test,' either in the extreme form advocated by Justice Harlan, ... or in the qualified form,
which was expressed in Justice Clark's 'crazy quilt test.).
136. Baker, 369 U.S. at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see McConnell, supra note 130,
at 106 (contending that "[als an interpretation of the political question doctrine, this was
nonsense," for the Court did not have the "judicially manageable means of choosing among"
all possible interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Michael Karman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 258 (1991) ("A close
examination of the various opinions in Baker reveals that on the issues of original intent,
political history, and judicial precedent, the dissenting Justices scored all of the points.").
137. See Charles, supra note 73, at 1113 ("This absence of standards links adjudication of
democratic politics under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Guarantee Clause....').
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In light of the Court's doctrinal history, it is hard to put much
stock in Justice Frankfurter's position. "I may be quite misguided
in this," Professor Scharpf complained, "but the idea that, after
almost one hundred eighty years of constitutional history based
upon a much longer tradition of political theory, the Supreme Court
should find itself without any guidelines in principle on one of the
most basic constitutional issues strikes me as particularly unpersua-
sive.""3 ' Unpersuasive indeed. This point applies with equal force to
cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause or the Guarantee
Clause.'39 Reynolds v. Sims ultimately put all doubts to rest, and
forcefully so. That Reynolds created and enforced a standard where
none previously existed should give us great pause. It should also
make us suspicious of any court that professes an inability to find
standards in a given area.
The lessons of this Part should be clear. Under the classical
theory, the Court seldom abstains any longer from deciding a
controversy, if it ever did; and under the prudential strand, the
Court must choose to abstain, in accordance with its idiosyncratic
reading of the underlying politics at issue. On either account, the
Court either acts or chooses not to act for political or practical
reasons. In this vein, we should understand Luther v. Borden and
Colegrove v. Green as instances when the Court, confronted with
competing alternatives, chose not to act. Existing doctrine did very
little work in these cases. Similarly, Baker v. Carr followed this
script, in the sense that practical considerations-not legal
ones-prompted the Court into action. Of note, this is a particular
constitutional issue for which questions of standards have seldom
offered much resistance.
II. RECONSIDERING THE COURT'S OFFICIAL POINT OF ENTRY:
BANDEMER'S PLURALITY OPINION
For several years, many Justices were willing to address the
constitutional questions raised by the gerrymander,' ° yet the Court
138. Scharpf, supra note 13, at 558.
139. See RIcHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 288 (4th ed. 1996) ("Are judicially manageable standards any less available
under the Guarantee Clause than under the Equal Protection Clause?").
140. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 784 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asking
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as an institution refused. This posture changed in 1986, when the
Court finally confronted this difficult challenge. The case was Davis
v. Bandemer.14 1 In Bandemer, the Court faced the political question
as applied to political gerrymandering cases head-on and concluded
that the doctrine did not insulate these claims from review., 2 In so
doing, the Court fit its holding squarely within the parameters of its
political question jurisprudence.
Looking in particular to Baker v. Carr and its progeny, the Court
offered the following: "[Iun light of our cases since Baker we are not
persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and manageable
standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be
decided."' This language has been derided as clumsy, for it shifts
the burden of proof from being persuaded that any such standards
exist to not being persuaded that they do not.'" I read this language
differently. It is implausible to look at our voting rights jurispru-
dence and suggest that any part of it is immune from judicial
review. Any such conclusion cannot be based on the view that these
standards do not exist, for standards abound. This is not a question
of standards, as the preceding Part underscored, but one ofjudicial
will. 45 Specifically, under the political question doctrine, the Court
would either act or choose not to act for reasons outside of the law.
The obvious starting point is Justice White's controlling opinion
in Bandemer. In general terms, the standard appears innocuous
enough: a successful complainant must show that the enacted
plan intentionally discriminated against "an identifiable political
group" 4 ' and must also show that the plan had "an actual
whether the political gerrymander presents a greater challenge to equal protection than
malapportionment); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Whatever the proper standard for identifying an unconstitutional gerrymander may be, I
have long been persuaded that it must apply equally to all forms of political
gerrymandering-not just to racial gerrymandering."); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 117, 122
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (evaluating the Fourteenth Amendment and redistricting);
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 555 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
141. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
142. See id. at 123.
143. Id.
144. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278-79 (2004) (plurality opinion).
145. See Weinberg, supra note 53, at 936 ("But it is the problem ofjudicial willingness that
I find interesting here; judicial power seems clear.").
146. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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discriminatory effect on that group."147 The first prong would
prove quite simple; as long as political bodies remain at the helm
of the districting process, "it should not be very difficult to prove
that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were
intended."148 The second prong has proven far more elusive. The
Court's own words have led to much disagreement and confusion. To
the plurality, for example,
unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade
a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as
a whole.
... [A]n equal protection violation may be found only where the
electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in
their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. In
this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be
supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a
majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters
of a fair chance to influence the political process.14
These passages have been subject to much attention though little
agreement. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor labeled this
standard "nebulous,"5 ° while Justice Powell contended that the
plurality "fail[ed] to enunciate standards" 5' at all. Scholars have
been equally uncharitable. Even those who agree that a manageable
Bandemer standard exists cannot agree on what this standard is. To
some, the standard demands an intentional and severe gerryman-
dering plan, "predictably nontransient in its effects."5 2 To others, it
is a run-of-the-mill Fourteenth Amendment case about the targeting
of "'suspect classification [s]."
147. Id.
148. Id. at 129.
149. Id. at 132-33.
150. Id. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
151. Id. at 162 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer and
Thornburg, in PoLrrIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29, 30 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
1990).
153. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection,
in POLITIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 152, at 64, 67.
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To my mind, Bandemer must be understood as a species of the
redistricting cases of the early 1960s. Then, recalcitrant state
legislatures refused to modify their existing district lines in order to
address drastic population shifts within their states. These were
"silent gerrymanders," 114 as the refusal to act resulted in a legisla-
tive body out of proportion with voting patterns across the state, to
the benefit of incumbent politicians. Further, the Court was facing
extreme, egregious instances of nonaction; after refusing to
redistrict for decades, the legislatures left lines bearing no sem-
blance of rationality. As the Court made clear in Reynolds v. Sims,
the goal at the heart of the reapportionment revolution was the
pursuit of fair representation.
Bandemer is part and parcel of this revolution, 5 ' for it is but "the
other half of Reynolds v. Sims."5 6 To begin, the Court was worried
about the same question of fair representation and often referred to
that problem.'57 It is also true that the plurality was in search of a
way to safeguard the political process cautiously; only egregious
examples should lead to judicial invalidation. On this point, the
criticisms leveled at Justice White's opinion have great force, for the
writing is often less than clear. The Court worried about consistent
degradation or effective denial of influence or continued frustration
of majority will. This language makes sense in the context of Baker
v. Carr and the reasons for which the Court came into the thicket.
The problem then was that a voting minority was able to hold on to
power indefinitely. Hence, if the Court could enforce a standard
then, there is very little reason to suspect that it could not do the
same again."'
In the gerrymandering context, my reading of Bandemer demands
a similar showing. To trigger the plurality's test, a complainant
154. See Leroy C. Hardy, Considering the Gerrymander, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 243,249-52 (1977).
155. See Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 152, at 11, 11.
156. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (referring to the "desirability
of fair group representation").
158. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 175,242 ("As the majority correctly perceived, the decision
that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable flows ineluctably from the Court's earlier
judgments that cases raising claims of population inequality among districts and of racial
gerrymandering are justiciable.").
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must show that a gerrymandered majority, in terms of seats won
in an election, is able to hold on to its gains irrespective of voting
patterns throughout the decade. This showing requires great
craftsmanship and has proven difficult to meet, and properly so.'
After all, the goal is to rein in the most extreme instances of
gerrymanders-those cases in which a minority gerrymanders itself
into political power notwithstanding majoritarian preferences. This
standard will be difficult to meet because, with Reynolds in place,
legislatures may not repeat the extreme abdications of responsibil-
ity witnessed pre-Baker. So long as redistricters are forced to act
after every census, it will prove quite difficult, if not impossible, to
hold on to gerrymandered gains through successive elections. 6 °
Unfortunately, the Vieth plurality failed to come to terms with the
real meaning of Bandemer. In particular, Justice Scalia's opinion
paid lip service to Justice White's argument while calling its
admonishment that the application of the standard will be difficult
"a gross understatement."' 6 ' Then, rather than a sustained argu-
ment for or against the plurality's position in Bandemer, the Vieth
plurality turned to Justice O'Connor's Bandemer concurrence for the
contention that the standard would prove arbitrary and unmanage-
able. '2 Support for this assertion came from select statements from
lower courts and various scholars.' 3 On this basis, the plurality
concluded: "Because this standard was misguided when proposed,
has not been improved in subsequent application, and is not even
159. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, 'Fair
Representation," and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 527, 563
(2003).
160. This formulation brings to mind Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker, where he
criticized the majority opinion for "indulg[ing] in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of
promise to the ear, sure[ly] to be disappointing to the hope." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was wide off the mark, of course, as
his forecast was "surely one of the worst predictions in the history of American constitutional
law." Alfange, supra note 157, at 257. At the time of Bandemer, it remained an open question
whether its mystifying standard would suffer a similar fate. This is no longer a question at
all, thus raising Justice Frankfurter's initial concern clearly and forcefully.
161. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 282 (2004) (plurality opinion).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 281 ("To think that this lower court jurisprudence has brought forth
'judicially discernible and manageable standards' would be fantasy.").
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defended before us today by the appellants, we decline to affirm it
as a constitutional requirement." 64
This was one of many standards to which the Vieth plurality
could have turned. Yet it seems unlikely that any standard would
have made any difference.'65 The plurality examined standards
offered by dissenting Justices, past Justices, and the Vieth plain-
tiffs. Yet, it remained unpersuaded by all of them.'66 The next Part
examines and ultimately disagrees with the plurality's conclusions.
III. WHERE ART THOU, STANDARDS?
From 1986 to the present, no standards "have emerged" in the
political gerrymandering area and Bandemer must be overturned.
This was the plurality's conclusion and it stuck to it. But can we
take the plurality seriously at its own word that no manageable
standards avail in this area? In the political gerrymandering area
in particular, many logical alternatives exist, none of which
impressed the plurality. For example, the Court as a whole could
have looked to the rich scholarly work in political science, where
standards abound.'67 The Court could also have borrowed from
standards developed by state courts. 6 ' Justices present and past
had also offered their doctrinal views on this issue.
This Part briefly examines some of the standards considered and
ultimately rejected by the Vieth plurality. In light of all these
available choices, it is puzzling indeed to argue that any such
standards, and even judicially manageable ones, do not exist. For
this reason, this Part considers the plurality's position with greater
164. Id. at 283-84.
165. In this vein, Mitchell Berman complains in a recent article that the plurality's analysis
and ultimate rejection of many possible standards "leaves much to be desired." Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 805 n.165 (2005).
166. The Court could have also turned to scholars in the field, but, again, I doubt it would
have made any difference at all. See, e.g., Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide
Electoral Effects Baseline, in PoLrIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 151,
at 145 (offering three options for the Court to follow in future political gerrymandering cases).
167. This might be a particularly fruitful line of inquiry, for as Rick Pildes has observed,
"[Ilaw and social science are perhaps nowhere more mutually dependent than in the voting-
rights field.' Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science
and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1518 (2002).
168. See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 645-47 (2004).
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care. It turns out that not only must the standard be one that courts
can sensibly manage, but it must also be judicially "discernible," in
the sense that it must be connected in some way to a constitutional
violation. This is a curious position, largely because the Court has
developed myriad standards across the spectrum of constitutional
law that can hardly be said to be tied to a constitutional violation.
This is a mere play upon words.'69 In light of this reticence, it is
clear that the plurality is simply unwilling to police the gerryman-
dering thicket. 7 °
A. Standards, Standards, and More Standards
1. Totality of Circumstances
It is part and parcel of the political process that those in charge
of drawing districting lines will attempt to imbue the process with
partisan overtones.' 7 ' Yet sometimes these political considerations
will overwhelm all others. The challenge for any gerrymandering
standard thus lies in drawing a sensible line between a legitimate
plan and an unconstitutional gerrymander. In his concurring
opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,'72 Justice Stevens recognized
this difficulty and, in turn, offered a three-part test. For Stevens, an
169. Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than
a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges
and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by
such political action and may be recovered for in suit at law hardly has been
doubted for over two hundred years.
Id.
170. For this reason, offering new tests likely will have little effect on the doctrine and will
prove to be nothing short of futile academic exercises. The key vote is clearly Justice
Kennedy's, and so efforts aimed at influencing the Court must be aimed at his position as
elucidated in his Vieth dissent. The fact that his demands are quite exacting, see Hasen, supra
note 23, at 634-37, leaves little hope that the Court will ultimately offer a useful guide in this
area.
171. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,753 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Legislators
are, after all, politicians; it is unrealistic to attempt to proscribe all political considerations
in the essentially political process of redistricting."). Justice Stevens made this point years
earlier, as a Seventh Circuit judge, in Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 860
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (limiting "the availability of judicial review to much
more egregious cases").
172. 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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extreme gerrymander is present when (1) the resulting map is
"uncouth," in that it is "manifestly not the product of a routine or a
traditional political decision"; (2) the plan impacts a minority group
adversely; and (3) the plan cannot be supported by neutral
districting criteria, so it is "either totally irrational or entirely
motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the minor-
ity."7 ' Put another way, plaintiffs must show that a plan has an
adverse effect on a political group while departing from traditional,
neutral districting principles. 7 4 Upon this showing, a state may
rebut such a claim by showing that the plan in fact pursues the
public interest.'75
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Bandemer, joined by
Justice Stevens, proposed a similar standard. 71 Under this stan-
dard, courts would consider myriad factors to determine whether
redistricters had gone too far, including the shape of the districts
under review, the use of preestablished political subdivisions, the
legislative history of the plan, and statistics that demonstrate vote
dilution, among others. 77 Justice Powell made clear that "[n]o one
factor should be dispositive." 78 In other words, he proposed a
totality of circumstances standard, which required a showing that
the legislature ignored all neutral principles at the expense of
partisanship.
179
On its face, this is a standard that courts could sensibly manage.
If the overarching question is whether redistricters have gone too
far, courts must simply look to these factors and determine whether
political considerations overwhelmed all others. Courts can do this;
in fact, they already do so in the analogous context of race-based
gerrymandering. If courts can already determine whether the use
of race predominated in the crafting of district lines, surely they can
do so as well when the dependent variable is politics.
173. Id. at 90.
174. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 754 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175. See id. at 751.
176. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
177. Id. at 173.
178. Id.
179. In his dissent in Vieth, Justice Breyer proposed a similar standard, rooted on a claim
of "unjustified entrenchment." See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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Yet the Vieth plurality was far from impressed with this stan-
dard. It argued that this is a test about whether the plan is
ultimately fair. And fairness, the plurality concluded, "does not
seem to us a judicially manageable standard.""8 This standard will
not do, for it will not meaningfully constrain judicial discretion
while providing legislators guidance about the limits of their
authority. A more "solid" criterion was needed, the plurality
concluded, "to win public acceptance for the courts' intrusion into a
process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking."'8 l
This argument evokes memories of Justice Frankfurter's strong
dissent in Baker. In light of the Court's vastly successful interven-
tion into the political thicket then,'82 it is hard to take the plurality's
argument at face value.
2. Vieth." The Plaintiffs Standard
In their brief, the Vieth plaintiffs offered a standard faithful to
Bandemer's two-pronged intent-plus-effects test, though they
defined both inquiries differently. They defined the intent test as a
predominant-factor inquiry, which they borrowed from Miller v.
Johnson.'" This fact alone, they argued, must render their test
both discernible and manageable."M As for the evidence necessary
to prove this claim, it would be either direct or circumstantial.8 5
Direct evidence would come from statements from partisans
involved in the redistricting process admitting that partisanship
predominated during the process."8 6 Circumstantial evidence would
come in through a showing that the state subordinated traditional
redistricting criteria to partisan considerations.' 87 Borrowing a page
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bush v. Vera,'" the
180. Id. at 291 (plurality opinion).
181. Id.
182. See Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 54 (1962).
183. See Brief for Appellants at 19, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (No. 02-1580), 2003 WL 22070244 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
184. See id. at 32.
185. Id. at 19.
186. See id. at 32.
187. Id.
188. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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plaintiffs concluded that the intent prong may be satisfied with
circumstantial evidence by a showing "not only that these tradi-
tional districting criteria have been neglected but also that this
neglect resulted from an effort to achieve partisan goals."189 For
support, the plaintiffs turned to Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. 9 °
The plaintiffs defined the effects test as a two-part test. First, a
plaintiff must show that the challenged plan "'pack[s]' and 'crack[s]'
the rival party's voters." 9' Second, through a "totality of circum-
stances" inquiry, a plaintiff must also demonstrate an inability of a
party "to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats."9 2
They analogized this inquiry to the inquiry under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.'93
The Vieth plurality disagreed on both fronts. First, it argued that
the necessary application of the intent test to a statewide plan
renders it vague and difficult to discern.' 9 ' Second, the predominant
factor test in the racial context "is easier and less disruptive." 95
Unsurprisingly, the effects test did not fare much better. To the
plurality, this test is neither tied to a constitutional violation nor
judicially manageable. 19
But this is much too fast. The intent test poses a straightforward
inquiry; courts can be expected to sort through the evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, in order to decide whether partisanship
played a predominant role during the redistricting process. In this
vein, one can take the view, expressed by Justice White in his
plurality opinion in Bandemer, that this is a pro forma inquiry;'97
after all, redistricters must be assumed to place partisanship at the
center of their redistricting goals. The facts in Vieth should put any
criticisms of this point to rest, for the evidence points clearly and
unequivocally to the conclusion that partisanship predominated
during the process that led to the creation of the challenged plan. It
189. Brief for Appellants, supra note 183, at 33 (citing Vera, 517 U.S. at 993 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
190. See id.
191. Id. at 19-20.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 36-37 (referencing the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)).
194. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285 (2004) (plurality opinion).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 141-42 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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is difficult to argue otherwise. Also, how is one to argue that a test
that courts have applied for some time in the Shaw context is not
manageable in the political context?
The effects test is also manageable. A court must show that a
redistricting plan cracks and/or packs voters of the minority party,
and does so in order to deprive the party of a legislative majority
even if the party garners a majority of votes. This is something that
courts sensibly can do. 9' Crucially, the same question applies under
the effects test as a section 2 inquiry; and if courts can do one-and
have done so for close to twenty years--certainly they can do the
other. Judicial manageability cannot possibly be the problem here,
unless something else is at play.
3. ViethL" Looking to Established Law-Stevens and Souter
Justice Stevens offered, inter alia, a variant of the expressive
harms introduced into the lexicon by Shaw v. Reno.' The harm at
issue was representational in kind, as the elected representative
would feel beholden not to the electors themselves but to those who
drew the district lines. In his own words, "the will of the cartogra-
phers rather than the will of the people will govern."00
Similarly, Justice Souter defended a standard modeled after the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.20'
In order to establish a prima facie case of vote dilution, the plaintiff
must satisfy five elements: (1) she must identify a cohesive political
group of which she is a member; (2) she must show that the district
where she resides is not crafted in accordance with traditional
districting criteria (e.g., compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions); (3) she must show a correlation between the lack of
traditional districting criteria and its effect on her group; (4) she
must offer a hypothetical district that includes her residence and
198. See Berman, supra note 164, at 805 n.165 ("But the argument as a whole-that
packing and cracking cannot be discerned--can hardly be taken seriously.").
199. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Writing for the majority in Shaw, Justice O'Connor stated that
district reapportionment plans that group together individuals "who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid.... [Such plans] may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that
majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract." Id. at 647-48.
200. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
2006] 1937
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
would fare better electorally and with less deviation from traditional
districting principles; and (5) she must show that those in charge of
redistricting intended to manipulate the shape of the district in
order to affect her group.21 2 Upon a showing of these five elements,
the burden would shift to the state to justify its plan in reference to
traditional districting principles. In general, Justice Souter would
look for whether there has been an "extremity of unfairness.""3
Again, this must be a judicially manageable test. For Justice
Stevens' representational harm, reliance on Shaw v. Reno should
guarantee as much. It is also worthy of note that Justice Stevens
has offered a consistent gerrymandering standard from the time of
his dissenting opinion as a Seventh Circuit judge in Cousins v. City
Council of Chicago. In Vieth, he was neither confused nor grasping
for any useful analytic framework; he was simply pointing out the
obvious inconsistencies between the Shaw line of cases and the
political gerrymandering cases. If Shaw and its progeny can possibly
be read as offering judicially manageable standards, 204 it is difficult
to argue that any area of the law is devoid of similar attributes. In
this vein, Justice Souter defended his test by observing that "the
elements I propose are not only tractable in theory, but the very
subjects that judges already deal with in practice." 5 Political
gerrymandering cases are clearly no more difficult than any others.
The plurality rejected both tests. It readily dismissed Justice
Stevens' expressive harms inquiry, as race is not politics, and
politics is not race.20 6 And besides, "[tihis Court may not willy-nilly
apply standards--even manageable standards-having no relation
to constitutional harms."20 7 The plurality also dismissed Justice
Souter's test, claiming it was as "flabby" a goal as Justice Powell's
indeterminate test.208
202. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 344.
204. For one such defense, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges
to Racial Redistricting in the New Millenium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 227, 300-04 (2001) (arguing that Shaw, in hindsight, should be read "as a
corrective").
205. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 353 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 295 (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 298.
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B. Vieth's Holy Grail: A Discernible, Manageable Standard
The plurality ultimately considered five different standards, yet
it rejected them all. Its doing so brings to mind Philip Kurland's
criticism of the Baker Court's conclusion that its opinion did not
conflict with precedent: "It is impossible to believe that the Court
was as artless as it represented itself to be; it is difficult to believe
that the Court thought it could find an audience ingenuous enough
to accept the assertion." °9 So what exactly did the Vieth plurality
have in mind when it wrote that no standards exist in this area? It
should be clear that many standards do exist in this area, even
though the Court refused to adopt any of them. What was the
plurality looking for while refusing to adopt any one standard as its
own?
To the plurality, the question ofjudicially manageable standards
was a two-pronged inquiry.210 The first question was that of locating
a standard that courts may reasonably manage.21' It is here where
the myriad models and accounts by academics and practitioners in
the field generally fit. Yet, for the Court a second inquiry was
necessary: once a standard is agreed upon, it must be "judicially
discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional
violation."212 This was the impetus behind one Justice's retort
during oral argument that plaintiffs counsel was "pulling [a
particular standard] out of a hat."21 '3 Any old hat simply will not
do; it must be a constitutional hat or, put differently, the
principle underlying the given standard must be contained in the
Constitution.
This is a curious position to take, yet it also explains much of
what goes on in Vieth. This is a curious position not only because
standards are only as judicially manageable as the Court professes
209. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term-Foreword: 'Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV.
143, 149 (1964).
210. Cf. Hasen, supra note 23, at 628 (explaining "that the judicial manageability debate
in Vieth conflates two separate concerns: one about consistency of result across the courts and
a second about the justifiability of a standard for judging partisan gerrymandering claims").
211. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (plurality opinion).
212. Id. at 287-88.
213. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 8.
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them to be,214 but also because standards are not always tied to a
constitutional violation. An easy example of this is the various tiers
of review under equal protection law.215 Tiered review is judicially
manageable only because the Court demands that it be so. Further,
it is quite difficult to tie this tiered approach to anything, much less
the Constitution, yet the Court hardly blinks when applying these
various tests.
The Vieth plurality recognized this apparent contradiction, but
remained undeterred. In response to the plaintiffs' use of the
predominant factor test from the race cases to buttress their
argument, the plurality answered that
courts might be justified in accepting a modest degree of
unmanageability to enforce a constitutional command which
(like the Fourteenth Amendment obligation to refrain from
racial discrimination) is clear; whereas they are not justified in
inferring a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation (the
obligation not to apply too much partisanship in districting)
which is both dubious and severely unmanageable.216
This argument ultimately gives the game away. We have been told
time and again that the standard must be judicially manageable
and connected to a constitutional violation. When confronted with
the seemingly countervailing example of equal protection, the
demand curiously changes: "a modest degree of unmanageability"
might be acceptable.21 v This distinction is ultimately unpersuasive.
To begin, this demonstrated willingness to ratchet standards up
or down in accordance with debatable conceptions of the constitu-
tional obligations at issue is in grave tension with the plurality's
position elsewhere. Ultimately, this argument makes one wonder
what the plurality is up to and whether any standard will satisfy its
exacting demands. For support, the plurality nodded toward the
214. See supra note 21; see also Mulhern, supra note 33, at 163 ("Nor can a lack of
'judicially discoverable ... standards' prevent review without casting doubt on all the Court's
controversial decisions interpreting the due process and equal protection clauses." (footnote
omitted)).
215. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny is the only proper tier of review for racial classification).
216. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
217. Id.
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"clear" command of equal protection,21 but this command is
hardly as clear as the plurality asserted.2 1 9 Neither the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the intent of its framers offers much
guidance for tiered review, or even for the "strict in theory, fatal in
fact" view of racial discrimination dominant in modern jurispru-
dence.22 If the Court can establish manageable standards under
equal protection law, it is difficult to believe that it cannot do the
same for election law.
The law of democracy offers a second, context-specific example of
the Court's propensity to develop "judicially manageable standards"
where none are readily apparent. This is the Court's shift from a
rationality inquiry in Baker v. Carr to the one person, one vote
standard in Reynolds v. Sims. It may also be said that the Court in
Reynolds was simply choosing a standard whose connection to a
constitutional violation is tenuous at best, and only so if one adopts
a rudimentary standard of the redistricting process and the
many factors at play. In the inimitable words of the late John Hart
Ely, the equipopulation principle "is certainly administrable. In
fact administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome
question is what else it has to recommend it." 22 ' This was Justice
Frankfurter's objection, yet the Court paid it very little heed.2 22
Equal protection demanded nothing less. Soon after Reynolds, equal
protection demanded even more, prompting a leading commentator
to remark that the Court was now in control of the political
218. See id.
219. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 133, 134 (2004).
220. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237;
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121
(1980); see also Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person,
One Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 208 (E.
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) ("One person, one vote ... is not an end
in itself or an equation of democracy and simple majority rule, as many members of the
current, post-Brennan Court believe."). For recent sustained critiques of the equipopulation
standard, see Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 213 passim (2003); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of
Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269passim (2002).
222. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300-01 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court's
equipopulation standard "is tied to the Equal Protection Clause only by the constitutionally
frail tautology that 'equal' means 'equal).
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thicket.22 Soon after that, the Court drew yet another line, between
state and congressional plans.224 For state plans, equal protection
allowed up to a ten percent deviation from equality,22 whereas
Article I was far stricter for congressional plans.226 These were
curious standards indeed, but the Court hardly flinched. This was
not the Court's most persuasive moment.
This demand for a discernible standard is the reason why we
witness in Vieth such a display of standards,2 7 all of them tied to a
preexisting constitutional violation. Justice Souter looked to
McDonnell Douglas,22 Justice Stevens turned to the expressive
harms branch of equal protection, 2 9 and the plaintiffs offered the
predominant factor test of Miller v. Johnson.230 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy was intrigued by the First Amendment and left out hope
that the Court might turn to the association cases for support of a
working standard.23' All of these arguments shared a belief that the
standard is both manageable and discernible in reference to a
constitutional violation. Yet the plurality was not persuaded by any
of them. And so we end up with a decision that hardly decided
anything.
In this vein, it is too easy to fault the Court for its apparent
inability to speak clearly. It is also easy to accuse the Court of
223. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress:
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 210 (1964) ("Courts not
only have entered the thicket, they occupy it."); see also Richard H. Pildes, Commentary, The
Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606 (1999) ("In the relatively short time
since [Baker], the United States Supreme Court has not only entered the 'political thicket,'
but with remarkable speed has found conflicts of democratic politics coming to dominate its
docket." (footnote omitted)).
224. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 741-42 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-25 (1973).
225. See White, 412 U.S. at 763-64; Mahan, 410 U.S. at 323-24, 328-29. But see Larios v.
Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2004), affd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (interpreting the
ten percent threshold as a rebuttable presumption, not a safe haven).
226. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 741.
227. And in fact, according to Dan Ortiz, this might have led to the dissenters' downfall.
"It was [the dissenters'] messiness," he wrote, "that persuaded the plurality that no judicially
manageable standards existed." Ortiz, supra note 115, at 501.
228. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
231. Guy Charles saw this connection prior to Vieth. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial
Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1209 passim (2003).
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failing to understand the issues properly. Yet, Vieth must be
understood as a condition of the plurality's unwillingness to patrol
this area, thus raising the next question: what makes political
gerrymandering different from most other areas of constitutional
law? Or, put another way, what was the plurality up to here? The
next Part considers and offers some preliminary answers to these
questions.
IV. EXPLAINING VIETH'S PASSMTY: LOOKING FOR VIRTUES?
The Pennsylvania redistricting plan had all the traditional
markers of a political gerrymander. And yet, in the face of a harm
that appeared so egregious, so visible, and so palpable to many, the
Court refused to intervene. The real story in Vieth is that ofjudicial
will. To the plurality, judicial intervention was unwarranted due to
a perceived lack of manageable standards."2 This is odd, however,
particularly from the same Court that gave us Shaw v. Reno and the
amorphous expressive harms inquiry." s Something else must be at
play here. We must view with great skepticism any instance when
a Court, and particularly this Court,"4 punts on a constitutional
question, professing an inability to carry out its constitutional
duties."5 This Part offers three explanations for this curious
posture.
A. Taking a Peek
While five Justices were looking for standards any place they
could find them, the Vieth plurality was confident that any such
standards would never be sufficient. The plurality was not satisfied
by any of the standards offered because, as Justice O'Connor wrote
in her concurring opinion in Bandemer, "no group right to an equal
share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of the
232. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 199.
234. See Barkow, supra note 97, at 240-44; Kramer, supra note 18, at 128-30.
235. I do not think any support for this point is needed, certainly not after Bush v. Gore.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) ("When contending parties invoke the
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal
and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.").
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Fourteenth Amendment."236 The plurality repeated this claim in
Vieth. 37 On their reading of the Equal Protection Clause, gerryman-
dering challenges must fail as an interpretive matter. The plurality
made its intentions clear when it demanded not only a judicially
manageable standard but also a standard that "is judicially
discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional
violation."23 8 This is not the posture of a Court abdicating its
constitutional duty but, rather, the posture of a Court engaging in
traditional judicial review.
In looking to the merits, rather than letting the political question
doctrine and the alleged lack ofjudicially manageable standards do
the work, the plurality hardly broke new ground. This is a conven-
tional move within the Court's political question jurisprudence. s
Yet Vieth is a troubling opinion. The plurality does not find
standards in this area because it never intended to do so. Litigants
will continue to press the Court for relief, offering innumerable
standards in the process. The plurality will not be persuaded, of
course, and, as long as Justice Kennedy remains skeptical, neither
will the Court as an institution. This is troubling because, as
Professors Issacharoff and Karlan explain, "lack of candor about
what courts are doing may carry its own costs."24° Rather than hide
behind the facade of the political question doctrine while holding out
a glimmer of hope that a standard may arise at some point in the
future, the Court owes prospective litigants more clarity. While
236. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
237. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion) (contending that
although the plaintiffs proposed standard "rests upon the principle that groups ... have a right
to proportional representation" the "Constitution contains no such principle").
238. Id. at 287-88.
239. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity
of its results ... judicial interference might well be appropriate."); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial
Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 85 (1962) (contending that Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan based their dissents in Baker on the merits, that is, that, "taking
their complaint at full value, the appellants in Baker v. Carr should not prevail"); Seidman,
supra note 26, passim (arguing that constitutional principles cannot decide political
questions); see also Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 614 (1987) (concluding that every decision to dispose of a case on
justiciability grounds necessarily reaches the merits of the controversy).
240. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?: Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 543 (2004).
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these litigants will not go away altogether,24' they will at least come
to federal court making arguments that will in fact matter.
B. Structure v. Rights
One may also explain Vieth as a poignant illustration of the
Court's long-standing failure to properly understand and analyze
gerrymandering claims. This point has gained much currency in
recent years in the form of a debate between those who advocate an
individual rights model of adjudication and those who advocate a
structural model. 2 The claim asserted by "individualists" is itself
rather simple: from the time the Court entered the field of politics
in Baker v. Carr, it has approached the questions in the field as
individual rights questions.2" The "one person, one vote" standard
has played a prominent role in this development, even if the
traditional tools of constitutional interpretation have offered little
help.2' To the Court, a person who lives in a malapportioned district
is debased-and thus harmed-as a citizen by virtue of that fact. In
contrast, a structural approach would demand reasons for the
design of the districts in question, of which population would be but
one consideration and not the determinative one.2 45 While Baker
itself may be understood as adopting a structural approach, the
Court soon moved toward an individual rights framework in
Reynolds v. Sims.24 The Court has extended this approach across
the field, including the gerrymandering cases.
241. See id. ("A first law of political thermodynamics guarantees that partisan challenges
cannot be eliminated.").
242. For a wonderful discussion and critique of this debate, see Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging
the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (reviewing RICHARD L. HASEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAw: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V.
GORE (2003)).
243. See generally id. at 1101 (summarizing the scholarly argument that the "sole purpose
of judicial review is to protect individual rights").
244. See id. at 1103.
245. See generally id. at 1101 (summarizing the "structuralist" argument that "the purpose
ofjudicial review is to assume that democratic institutions behave in ways that are respectful
of democratic principles").
246. 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) ("A predominant consideration in determining whether a
State's legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an inviduous discrimination violative
of rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that rights allegedly impaired are
individual and personal in nature.').
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Herein lies the problem. In trying to fit what are essentially
structural claims-claims about the structure of our democratic
institutions-into an individual rights mold, structuralists contend
that the Court errs and ultimately runs into the confusion we see in
Vieth. On this account, the Court must face up to the challenges
posed by the structural claims that gerrymandering cases clearly
pose.
This is an intriguing account of the Court's misadventures
through the law of democracy." 7 As an account of the Court's
apparent confusion in Vieth, however, it is far less promising. On
one side of the debate is the Vieth plurality, looking for standards
yet not trying very hard.' On the other side are four Justices
offering three separate standards in the hope of persuading a fifth
Justice to agree with any of them.249 While Justice Kennedy rejects
all three standards, he leaves open hope for a fourth.
250
It is quite sensible to read this exchange between Justices as an
example of the doctrinal confusion borne out of a failure to use the
proper normative tools. Yet that might be giving the Court too much
credit. As soon as Justice Kennedy settles on an approach to these
claims under the First Amendment, I suspect that the other four
Justices will fall in line.25' For them, it is clear that a harm, and an
egregious one at that, is present when the state gerrymanders its
247. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 28.
248. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part III.A.
250. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
251. Compare, for example, the debate between Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy in
the Shaw cases. Compare Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (O'Connor, J.) (holding
appellants had stated a cause of action but not ruling on the constitutionality of the
redistricting), with Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (Kennedy, J.) (invalidating a
redistricting plan as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Breyer explained as
much in his dissenting opinion in Vieth:
The dissenting opinions recommend sets of standards that differ in certain
respects. Members of a majority might well seek to reconcile such differences.
But dissenters might instead believe that the more thorough, specific reasoning
that accompanies separate statements will stimulate further discussion. And
that discussion could lead to change in the law, where, as here, one member of
the majority, disagreeing with the plurality as to justiciability, remains in
search of appropriate standards.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 368 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this vein, Rick Hasen
compares the three standards "paraded" by the dissenting Justices to "contestants in a beauty
pageant." Hasen, supra note 23, at 627; see also id. at 632 (arguing that "the four Vieth
dissenters are likely to go along with whatever standard Justice Kennedy would embrace").
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district lines. Whether we examine it under the Guarantee Clause,
the Equal Protection Clause, or the First Amendment, the harm is
no different to them. In this vein, Vieth takes us back to Baker one
more time. Justice Frankfurter's admonition in Baker is particularly
appropriate: "[The present case] is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause
claim masquerading under a different label."252 Masquerading
indeed. Labels do not get us very far.
C. Sending Signals and Keeping Secrets
One may read the Vieth plurality instead as signaling a judicial
willingness to retreat in the face of difficult and contested ques-
tions of social policy. After a brief yet notorious misadventure in
the gerrymandering thicket, the plurality appears willing to call
it a day. In so doing, it ultimately draws support from Justice
Frankfurter's pointed advice in Baker:
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary
complexity, involving-even after the fundamental theoretical
issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative
legislature have been fought out or compromised-consid-
erations of geography, demography, electoral convenience,
economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular
local groups, communications, the practical effects of political
institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient tradi-
tions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of
long experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics,
censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.'
A gerrymandering claim must be understood precisely within
this context. These claims simply wish to restrict the universe of
considerations that redistricters may legitimately take into
account. A plan may reflect considerations of geography, population,
252. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Carl A.
Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 85 ("It is unfortunate, then, that the Court argued in Baker v. Carr that 'any
reliance' on the Guarantee Clause in Apportionment Controversies would be futile. (footnote
omitted)); Paul G. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REV.
243, 244 (1964) (discussing the difficulties presented by Baker).
253. Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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communities of interest, and even racial and political data,254 but it
must not "gerrymander" as the term is commonly understood. And
so, to quote Frankfurter again, "aye, there's the rub."255 If the Court
were truly serious about sending any signals at all, Vieth would be
but a small ripple in a larger and far-reaching counterrevolution,
and Baker would be overruled. But this is not going to happen, and
properly so.26
Put another way, we simply cannot read the political gerryman-
dering cases as distinct from the redistricting cases. They are one
and the same.257 To begin, the notion of fair and effective represen-
tation is at the heart of both doctrines. Further, and relatedly,
Baker makes sense when viewed as a response to the egregiously
malapportioned legislatures of the 1960s. The facts in Baker were
extreme, and so judicial intervention was both prudential and
necessary. Once the legislatures were prodded into action, the need
for judicial intervention lessened because the egregious conditions
that demanded action had waned. Bandemer must be understood
similarly. Judicial intervention is necessary and warranted only
when redistricters perform their tasks too well and relegate the
minority party's presence in state legislative bodies to minority
status in perpetuity. In a sense, this is what happened in Baker. So
as one goes, so must the other.25
On the Vieth plurality's own terms, a distinction is found in the
concept of manageable standards. There is such a standard--one
person, one vote-for redistricting,259 but not for political gerryman-
254. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a partisan redistricting plan);
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (reversing the district court's determination that the
State violated the Equal Protection Clause because the legislature drew its redistricting plan
to protect incumbents).
255. Baker, 369 U.S. at 269 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
256. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 519 (2004) ("T]he self-interest of elected state
legislators can undermine democratic values, and the intervention of unelected judges can
promote them.").
257. For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating
the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair Representation, and the Necessary Question
of Judicial Will, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 423 (2005).
258. Cf. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 239, at 543 ("[N]o matter how difficult judicial
review of political gerrymandering claims may be ... the overall doctrinal structure governing
redistricting makes it impossible actually to render such claims nonjusticiable.").
259. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
381 (1963).
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dering. But this argument only goes so far; the equipopulation
standard became so only by judicial fiat. The Court similarly could
have chosen a standard from the many choices among its fledgling
gerrymandering jurisprudence, yet it has refused to do so. We thus
return to the initial query: how to explain the plurality's position?
This question brings the argument full circle, back to the political
question doctrine. When the plurality invoked the tenets of the
political question doctrine, its reading of the doctrine was suspect
at best. Early in the opinion, for example, the plurality offered a
brief history of the gerrymandering problem while remarking that
the framers were not only aware of this issue but also provided a
solution for it in the Constitution.26 ° Under Article I, Section 4, the
states are given the initial responsibility to draw electoral districts
for federal elections, yet Congress retains the authority to "'make or
alter'" these districts.2"' This is a power that Congress has used for
many years, dating back to the Apportionment Act of 1842.262
Congress itself is aware of this power, and it is also aware of the
gerrymandering problem. 3 Yet, while many bills regulating this
practice have been introduced in Congress since 1980, none has
been enacted into law.2" Thus, under the classical political question
doctrine, this should be the end of the inquiry. This is a question
reserved by the Constitution to Congress, not to the federal courts.
The argument, however, did not go anywhere, and the plurality
did not explain why.265 Knowing how little remains of the classical
doctrine after Powell v. Macormack, I suppose that there was very
little to say. Only then does the Court turn to the question of
standards. This move could be understood in one of two ways.
It may be that the plurality is moving within the prudential
strand of the doctrine, an area where the Court has historically
masked its political judgments under the veneer of law and
principled decision making. Standards clearly exist, in all shapes
260. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274-77 (2004) (plurality opinion).
261. Id. at 275 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl.1).
262. Id. at 276-77.
263. Id.
264. See id. (providing five examples of introduced legislation that was not acted upon).
265. Professors Issacharoff and Karlan refer to this part of the opinion as an "intriguing
feint," before offering a very pointed and interesting critique. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra
note 239, at 559-60.
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and sizes, yet the plurality was not attracted to any of them and
instead chose not to act.
In taking this position, the Court curiously sided with Bickel's
passive virtues. Yet Bickel wrote during a time when the Court
asserted its muscle against state and local officials hell-bent on
resisting the Court and its edicts, particularly in reference to racial
integration. Bickel understood the Court as stretching its legitimacy
too far when it took on any and all comers in its fight against
segregation. Passivity was thus a virtue, according to Bickel, for it
preserved the Court's reservoir of public good will for when it
needed it most.
Such worries hardly occupy the Court's time today. These are
times when the Court can and does assert its will confidently. The
Court is ready to take on any and all comers, with little regard for
how its edicts will play out in the public sphere. The prudential
strand of the political question doctrine explains very little, if
anything at all, in this arena. Hence, a better explanation is still
needed.
A related reading of Vieth posits a Court uncomfortable with its
role in political affairs and willing to finally call it a day. As Robert
Nagel argued more than a decade ago, "[tihe fact that it has been
possible to find, construct, or imagine the possibility of judicially
manageable standards does not alter the political nature of
underlying constitutional questions." 6 More generally, he contin-
ued, "Itihe Burger Court politicized judging as it legalized politics.
It accomplished wholesale what Bickel imagined at the margin and
it made a fact of what his critics feared."26 On this reading, this is
a clash of paradigms, dating back to 1962 and the Court's entry into
the political field with Baker v. Carr.
On this view, the Vieth plurality must be seen as wishing to
remove the Court from the world of politics and return it to the
world of Colegrove v. Green.26 At first glance, this seems like an
266. Nagel, supra note 21, at 664.
267. Id. at 668.
268. For a wonderful discussion of exit strategies as directly applied to voting rights
doctrine, see Karlan, Exit Strategies, supra note 27, and Grant M. Hayden, The Supreme
Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 949 (2005) (arguing
that the Court must relax its equipopulation standard as part of its deferential posture of
recent years).
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unlikely proposition. Yet we also know that various Court members
have demonstrated a clear desire to remove the Court from many
doctrinal terrains. Within the law of democracy itself, Justice
Thomas has forcefully questioned-and called for an end-to the
modern vote dilution jurisprudence under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.2"9 Vieth may be understood as part of this modern trend
within the Court. And this is a debate worth having,270 rather than
getting bogged down in a meaningless search for standards.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a puzzle: how to explain the Court's
humble opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer in light of the Court's aggres-
sive posture within the larger universe of constitutional law? The
plurality in Vieth contended that no judicially manageable stan-
dards exist, and so it had to abdicate any and all constitutional
duties to police the gerrymandering thicket. This Article takes issue
with this characterization. In reviewing the political question
doctrine at the heart of the plurality's opinion, this Article contends
that the doctrine offers very little resistance to judicial action. In
fact, any "resistance" as such comes from within the prudential
strand of the doctrine-when the Court refuses to act in the face of
clear power to do so.
Thus, in invoking the traditional mantra of "manageable stan-
dards," the plurality positioned itself within the prudential strand
of the doctrine. Yet the considerations that traditionally influence
269. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In my view,
however, the only principle limiting the scope of the terms ... derived from the text of the Act
would exclude ... challenges to allegedly dilutive election methods ....").
270. See Richard L. Hasen, A 'Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed Rehabilitation
of Bush v. Gore, 80 TEE. L. REv. 137, 154 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCir THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001)) ("If the
Supreme Court will intervene periodically in the political process, it behooves us to continue
the debate over when it is appropriate for courts to intervene in the political process."); see
also Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 923,925 (2001) ("The question of appropriate restraints onjudicial intervention
into the political arena has taken on increasing urgency since the constitutionalization of
large domains of politics."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in
a Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359 (2001) (arguing that both opinions in Baker
and Bush rested on faulty reasoning and cannot be distinguished). For a recent effort along
these lines, see HASEN, supra note 241.
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a court to abstain on political question grounds are not present in
Vieth. Judicial supremacy is alive and well, for the Court is
unashamed to flex its muscle and unconcerned by any adverse
reception to its rulings. Hence, this Article concludes that the
plurality's opinion must be understood as a signal to reorient the
field. In invoking the prudential strand of the political question
doctrine, the plurality aligned itself with previous calls from the
Court to abdicate particular fields. This is a marked shift from the
aggressive judicial posture we have seen in the field of politics from
the time of Baker v. Carr. This Article does not take sides on this
worthy debate; yet, as the Court continues to gain confidence in
traversing the political 'thicket, scholars must look back to Baker
and the reasons that prompted judicial intervention in matters of
politics. The Vieth plurality began, even if sub silentio, this conver-
sation.
